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It is often suggested that team spirit counteracts free-riding. Testing for team
spirit with ¯eld data is di±cult, however, due to an inherent identi¯cation problem.
In this paper test for team spirit experimentally. In a team work task we vary
subjects' information about relative team performance while we leave unchanged
the structure of explicit incentives. We ¯nd that subjects contribute more to their
team's project when teams observe each others' performance. We attribute this
result to the enhancement of team spirit caused by asymmetric peer e®ects between
observing teams.
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"If one could enhance a common interest in nonshirking in the guise of team
loyalty or team spirit the team would be more e±cient. [...] The di±culty, of
course, is to create economically that team spirit and loyalty. "
Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 790f.)
Team work can have important bene¯ts. Such bene¯ts arise, for instance, when there
are e±ciency gains due to knowledge transfer or specialization, or when the technol-
ogy generates complementarities between the work of individuals. However, individual
contributions to team output frequently cannot be enforced, which renders team work
susceptible to free-riding (e.g., HolmstrÄ om 1982). Since free riding hampers productivity,
one would hardly expected ¯rms to organize work in teams. On the contrary, business
organizations make heavy use of teams. For example, Osterman (1994) ¯nds that 55 per-
cent from a 1992 survey of American establishments employ teams. According to Lawler
(2001), even 72 percent of Fortune 1000 companies make use of work teams.
How can we explain that free riding in teams is not overwhelming? Modern work
organizations commonly evaluate and reward teams according to the joint performance of
team members. Yet, under standard economic assumptions these group incentives would
have no e®ects to motivate workers. A way to circumvent the basic incentive problem is
the use of competitive schemes which reward subjects according to relative performance
(Lazear and Rosen 1981). Unfortunately, the implementation of the appropriate relative
pay scheme is di±cult to achieve in the ¯eld. For instance, relative rewards may be
ine±cient if contestants are asymmetric (Che and Gale 2003), or they may not be feasible
practically, for example, when there are adverse e®ects on work morale that foil the
intentions of the management.1
Recent theoretical contributions have proposed peer e®ects as a motive why workers
abstain from free-riding in teams (e.g., Kandel and Lazear 1992, Barron and Gjerde 1997,
Che and Yoo 2001, and Huck, KÄ ubler, and Weibull 2001, Huck and Biel 2004). By peer
e®ects this literature means that workers have social preferences which induce them to
conform with actions of others, i.e., workers receive a disutility if their e®ort deviates
from the e®ort of their peers.2 Peer e®ects can raise contributions of the less productive
workers if they follow the example of high performers. On the other hand, such e®ects can
1In some cases the implementation of relative rewards can even cause sanctions of peers against high
performers. A likely reason for such behavior is that low performers try to reduce negative externalities
caused by high performers on their wages under relative pay schemes. See, Fehr and Falk (2002).
2This interpretation of peer e®ects is conceptually di®erent from rational imitation and information
cascades, sometimes also called "conformity" or "social in°uence" (see, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch 1998).
1also reduce the e®orts of the productive workers if they are in°uenced by low performers.
Therefore, the net impact of peer e®ects on total productivity is undetermined and which
e®ect dominates is an important empirical question.
Despite its importance, our knowledge about the empirical relevance of peer e®ects
is limited. Peer e®ects give rise to endogenous social interactions, which are generally
di±cult to identify because of confounding factors (Manski 1993). Such confounds arise,
¯rst, if members of a team share relevant individual characteristics. For example, teams
may improve productivity regardless of peer e®ects if highly skilled workers can self-select
into teams and in this way signal their abilities relative to low skilled co-workers. A second
source of confounds is that a team may be exposed to unobserved exogenous factors that
in°uence people's behavior. This case would apply, for example, if teams improve the
opportunities to monitor and sanction free-riders for purely organizational reasons (Knez
and Simester 2001). Although existing empirical studies have made important steps
towards solving the identi¯cation problem with regard to endogenous social interactions
(see, for example, Sacerdote 2001, Ichino and Maggi 2000, and the literature cited by
these authors), the phenomenon of peer e®ects is still not well understood.
Recently, Falk and Ichino (2003) have applied experimental methods to identify peer
e®ects empirically. In a ¯eld experiment subjects work for the experimenter and are
paid independent of individual performance for the time they are working. The authors
¯nd that e®orts of individual workers positively correlate with the observed output of
other workers. An important observation is that when subjects work in pairs overall
productivity rises. Finally, the authors ¯nd that peer e®ects induce the least productive
subjects to work harder.
In this paper we ask whether the results provided by Falk and Ichino (2003) are
generalizable to a situation where work is organized in teams. We take their results as
starting point and ask whether peer e®ects reduces the incentive to free ride on team
production. This task is demanding since it requires that peer e®ects are separated
empirically from other motives why team members may in°uence each other. First, we
need to exclude the possibility that team members have any economic incentive to react
towards each other. For instance, if a worker's e®ort relative to others' within a team
increases his prospects to get ahead, correlated behavior between team members could
not be attributed to peer e®ects. Second, a large body of evidence con¯rms the relevance
of reciprocity based e®ects of conditional cooperation (see, Croson 1998, Keser and van
Winden 2000, Fischbacher, GÄ achter, and Fehr 2001, Falk, Fischbacher and GÄ achter 2003).
Conditional cooperation is a motive according to which people reciprocate kind behavior
of others. Thereby, a person's behavior is perceived as kind if it is bene¯cial for oneself.
Within teams the own well-being depends on the e®orts of other team members and as a
consequence peer e®ects are inherently confounded with e®ects of conditional cooperation
(see, Bardsley and Sausgruber 2005).
2Taking into account these considerations, we conduct a laboratory experiment to eval-
uate the relevance of peer e®ects in teams. In our experiment subjects perform a standard
team-work task. The basic idea to separate peer e®ects from alternative accounts is to
have pairs of teams.3 Subjects in team X observe their own team's behavior and they
also observe the behavior of another team Y . Importantly, a subject's payo® in team X
does not depend on the achievements of team Y : teams are payo®-independent. In this
setup, reciprocal subjects in team X have no reason to cooperate conditionally on the
behavior of subjects in team Y . Nor are there any economic incentives to contribute to
team production at all. In contrast, peer e®ects between teams may exist irrespective of
the fact that payo®s in teams are independent.
We test whether teams which can observe each other's performance are more produc-
tive than isolated teams because of peer pressure. We test whether peer e®ects exist and
have the potential to give rise to "team spirit". By team spirit we mean that the presence
of peer e®ects between teams leads to a social multiplier towards better outcomes.4 The
multiplier e®ect arises because the existence of peer pressure induces a strategic comple-
mentarity between contribution choices. The positive direction of the multiplier e®ect
arises from asymmetric peer e®ects if low performers are more a®ected by peer pressure
than high performers.
We ¯nd that subjects exert indeed more e®ort when teams can mutually observe each
other's performance. We ¯nd evidence for peer e®ects between teams. Furthermore, these
a®ects appear to be asymmetric, i.e., peer e®ects are stronger for those who contribute
less e®ort than others. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the
experimental procedures. In section 3 we propose a simple model to derive our hypotheses.
Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Subjects participate in a standard linear public good game. This game constitutes a
typical team dilemma, since every team member pro¯ts from the team output regardless of
3Falk, Fischbacher, and GÄ achter (2003) apply a similar experiment with overlapping teams to test for
social interactions. The essential di®erence between this study and ours is that our teams do not overlap,
which allows us to separate peer e®ects from reciprocal behavior.
4As in the above quote by Alchian and Demsetz (1992), the economic literature occasionally refers to
team spirit (see also, Kandel and Lazear 1992). However, this literature provides no clear-cut de¯nition
of team spirit. Similarly, although human resource management invests considerable resources in team
spirit building activities (e.g., Heermann 1997), there it is also not clear what team spirit exactly means.
For instance, social psychology regards team spirit as a sense of collective responsibility for the team's
success, a mentality of team members to go beyond themselves, an expression of positive group identity,
or an enthusiastic loyalty towards the team (e.g., De Cremer and Van Dijk 2002).
3whether he or she bears the cost of individual e®ort. Subjects are randomly organized into
teams. There are 4 people in each team and each subject is endowed with 20 experimental
points. The points can either be kept or invested into a joint team project that generates
a payo® for everyone in the team. Payo®s are determined according to




Here, ¼i is subject i's payo® in points, xi is i's contribution to the team project, and ®
is the marginal per-capita return of contributing to the team project. In the experiment,
® is set at a value of 0.4.
The game was repeated for 20 periods with constant composition of teams. In any
period, at the time a new decision has to be made, subjects learn the total sum of
contributions of their team as well as their private earnings in the previous period. In
addition, we provide information about the average team earnings accumulated over all
previous periods (see appendix AII, for a complete set of instructions).
Teams are randomly matched into pairs such that for every team X in the experiment
there exists a team Y . Subjects in team Y are paid according to ¼j = 20¡yj+®
P4
k=1 yk,
where ¼j and yj denote payo® and contributions of subject j in team Y . Note that
payo®s between teams X and Y are independent. A team's matched team remains the
same throughout the experiment. The treatments exclusively vary the °ow of information
between teams. Everything else remains exactly the same. The structure of the treatment
variation is illustrated in Table 1. In this table X and Y refer to teams within a pair.
Our main treatment is labelled "MUTUAL" (upper left cell): In this treatment paired
teams are mutually informed about their performance. In addition to the information
available about their own team, subjects of team X learn last period's overall contribu-
tion to the team project and accumulated average team earnings in team Y , and vice
versa. Instructions ensured that the information structure was common knowledge. The
information enables subjects to evaluate the relative team performance in the previous
period as well as in the experiment as a whole.
Table 1: Illustration of treatment conditions (X-team's perspective towards Y -team)
Team Y sees team X
Yes No
Team X sees Yes MUTUAL OBSERVER
team Y No OBSERVED BASE
4As a control treatment, we implement a mixed-information condition where the
°ow of information between paired teams is one-sided. This produces two types of
teams/treatments: An X-team ("OBSERVER") sees how it performs relative to a Y -
team, just as in MUTUAL. What is di®erent now is that the Y -team ("OBSERVED")
does not see how it compares to its paired X-team; OBSERVED-subjects know that
there is another team learning their overall contributions and accumulated average team
earnings.
Finally, we run a baseline, labelled "BASE" (lower right cell), which implements the
standard version of the public good game. In this treatment no team is informed about
another team.
3 Theoretical Predictions
To illustrate how we expect peer e®ects to operate in our design consider the following
model. There are i = 1;:::;m subjects in team X and j = m + 1;:::;m + n subjects in
team Y . There are t = 1;:::;T periods. In the experiment we set m = 4, n = 4, and
T = 20. In every period t, the utility Uit of a subject i depends on its material payo®,
as speci¯ed in eq. (1), and it may depend on the di®erence between the subject's own
contribution and the contribution of others in the previous period. In the literature this
assumption is called "myopic best reply" (see, Huck, Normann, and Oechsler 1999).
We attribute a relation between own and others' e®orts to two behavioral motives.
First, there is conditional cooperation. Conditional cooperation is a motive relevant only
towards members of the own team. This is so because a subject's material well-being in
team X is not a®ected by the actions of team-Y members. Second, there are peer e®ects.
Peer e®ects exist irrespective of whether the behavior of peers is materially relevant.
In particular, in our setup it will be important whether subjects are in°uenced by the
behavior of another team even if that team is irrelevant for the own payo®.
Conditional cooperation and peer e®ects both predict that subjects are in°uenced by
the behavior of others. In this respect, we assume that this in°uence is through the
average behavior of others. This assumption allows for a substantial simpli¯cation of the
model and is standard in studies on social interactions (for the so-called linear-in-means
model, see, Manski 1993). Moreover, the assumption is behaviorally warranted to the
extent that average behavior certainly is a prominent indicator of the prevalent social
norm (see, Moscovici 1985).
Consider subjects in treatments MUTUAL and OBSERVER, ¯rst. In this treatment
members of team X can observe another team Y . The utility for subject i in team X is












Here, (xi ¡ x¡i(t¡1)) measures the di®erence between subject i's contribution and the
average contribution of the other X-team members in the previous period. The term
(±i + °i) measures the degree of responsiveness towards this di®erence. We assume that
this e®ect is additively decomposable into the e®ect of conditional cooperation due to
reciprocity ±i ¸ 0, and the peer e®ect towards others °i ¸ 0. The term (xi ¡ y(t¡1))
measures the di®erence between subject i's contribution and the average contributions of
another team, that of team Y . Since payo®s in team X are independent of contributions in
team Y this di®erence should not matter for subjects with reciprocal motives. Therefore,
the responsiveness towards this di®erence is only determined by °i, which again measures
the degree to which a subject i is in°uenced by others due to peer e®ects. Notice that
we assume the same in°uence of others through peer e®ects °i regardless of whether
the others are members of the own or the other team. This assumption enables us to
empirically identify peer e®ects against reciprocity.
In this setup, every period constitutes a subgame in which subjects play their best-
reply towards previous contributions of others. From ¯rst-order conditions we derive




® ¡ 1 + (±i + °i)x¡i(t¡1) + °iy(t¡1)
±i + 2°i
]: (3)
For °i > 0 it holds that @x¤
it=@y(t¡1) > 0. Because empirical evidence on peer e®ects
is still scant, this motivates our ¯rst hypothesis regarding the existence of peer e®ects:
Hypothesis 1 If peer e®ects exists, the higher the average contribution of team Y in the
previous period, the higher is a team-X subject's contribution to the own team project in
the current period, i.e., corr[xit;y(t¡1)] > 0.
One can see that with ° = 0 teams are strategically independent; however, with
° > 0 e®orts in teams become strategic complements. Strategic complementarity is an
important ingredient to endogenous social interaction e®ects. Most importantly, strategic
complementarity can give rise to social multiplier e®ects. Consider the case where all
subjects face an identical shock. Multiplier e®ects are present when the aggregate response
exceeds the individual response to that shock. Likewise, if subject i, for instance, increases
own contributions, this increases the marginal return to all other's contributions, thereby
causing an aggregate response of all other subject. Our interest is to see whether peer
e®ects can trigger social multiplier e®ects in the sense of team spirit:
6De¯nition 1 By "team spirit" we mean that a number of teams whose members can
observe the teams' achievements are ceteris paribus more productive than a number of
isolated teams.
We now turn to question under which conditions team spirit can emerge in our design.
Writing eq. (3) individually for all subjects i in team X and all subjects j in team Y
constitutes a system of linear di®erences equations, which can be represented in matrix
notation as
zt = max[0;c + Az(t¡1)]: (4)
Here, zt denotes the vector of individual contributions in period t. c is a vector of
constants with ci = (® ¡ 1)=(±i + 2°i) in treatment MUTUAL, and ci = (® ¡ 1)=(±i + °i)
in treatment BASE. A is a matrix with dimension k£k and k = (n+m), whose elements
weigh last period's contributions of others as functions of individual i's ±i and °i (a
de¯nition of A is provided in Appendix AI). For an initial condition z0 the general solution







In this equation, the second term,
Pt¡1
h=0 Ahc, represents the intertemporal equilibrium
level of z. The ¯rst term, Atz0, is a complementary function which speci¯es the deviations
of the time path from the intertemporal equilibrium. Without peer e®ects, i.e., °i = °j =
° = 0, the eigenvalues of matrix A have absolute values either smaller or equal to 1. In
both these cases, zt converges to zero as t grows larger.6
Introducing peer e®ects will now have two e®ects: ¯rst, it reduces the eigenvalues of
A. This e®ect enhances the decay of cooperation. However, a second consequence of
peer e®ects is a reduction of the constant c. This e®ect slows down the convergence to
equilibrium. Whether peer e®ects reduce or enhance the decay of cooperation depends on
the particular parameter constellation. In the next section we will illustrate the impact
of peer e®ects on the aggregate contribution pattern.
3.1 Symmetric peer e®ects
In the previous section we pointed out that the overall impact of peer e®ects on the contri-
bution dynamics are ambiguous. Yet, a simulation of the contribution pattern according
5We assume that an initial condition is exogenously given. For instance, subjects may have an ex-
ogenous ex ante belief about others' cooperativeness. Alternatively, one could assume that positive
contributions have been enforced by a third party in period t = 0, before the game actually starts.
6Note that for eigenvalues equal to 1 it holds that ® < 1 and therefore c < 0.
7to eq. (5) with di®erent parameter constellations can illustrate testable implications of
peer e®ects in our design. We ¯rst consider cases where subjects are homogenous, i.e.,
±i = ±j = ± and °i = °j = ° = 0; 8 i 2 X and j 2 Y .
Case 1 (± = 0:4; ° = 0:1; x0 = 20; y0 = 0): Here, the X-team initially is fully
productive whereas the Y -team contributes zero e®orts. Call xy (TMT) the average
aggregate e®ort in teams X and Y in the respective treatment. In this case it holds: xy
(BASE) > xy (MUTUAL) > xy (OBSERVER/OBSERVED). This result is illustrated in
Figure 1. The ¯gure shows the simulation of average e®ort contributions for the ¯rst 10
periods in the respective treatments. In BASE, subjects in the X-team reduce e®orts at
a constant rate from one period to the next (see, "av.X" in the left panel of Figure 1).
In OBSERVER, peer e®ects towards the other team accelerate the decay in cooperation
("av.X" in the central panel of Figure 1). In MUTUAL peer e®ects have two implications.
First, as in OBSERVER, it reduces e®orts in the productive X-team. Second, it stimulates
e®orts in the unproductive Y -team ("av.Y" in right panel of Figure 1). Case 1 is a
case where team spirit cannot be observed on the aggregate, i.e., peer e®ects do not
heave aggregate e®orts in MUTUAL above those in BASE ("av.XY" in the left panel as
compared to "av.XY" in the right panel of Figure 1).
























































Case 2 (± = 0:4; ° = 0:1; x0 = 10; y0 = 10): Here, all subjects initially exert the
same e®ort. In this case it holds: xy (MUTUAL) > xy (OBSERVER/OBSERVED)>
xy (BASE). Starting values and preference parameters are the same in all treatments.
However, the treatments di®er with respect to the vector c. In OBSERVED and BASE
ci = (® ¡ 1)=(±i + °i), whereas in MUTUAL and OBSERVER ci = (® ¡ 1)=(±i + 2°i).
Hence, cooperation in e®orts decays at a lower rate in MUTUAL and OBSERVER than in
OBSERVED and BASE. Moreover, in MUTUAL this e®ect applies to both teams, X and
Y . As a consequence, peer e®ects slow down the decay in cooperation in team X, which
8in turn slows down the decay in cooperation in team Y , and so on. Here, peer e®ects have
e®ort-enhancing e®ects on OBSERVER-teams and this e®ect enforces between teams in
treatment MUTUAL: overall productivity rises and team spirit exists.
Case 3 (± = 0:4; ° = 0:1; x0 = 0; y0 = 20): Concerning the treatment e®ect between
MUTUAL and BASE, this case is equivalent to case 1. What is di®erent now is that peer
e®ects will have strong e®ort-enhancing e®ects in the OBSERVER-teams and, di®erent
from MUTUAL, conformity towards an unproductive team does not accelerate the decay
in cooperation in OBSERVED-teams. Hence we get: xy (OBSERVER/OBSERVED) >
xy (MUTUAL) > xy (BASE).
Case 1 to 3 illustrate that homogenous preferences for conformity may have e®ort
enhancing as well as e®ort withholding e®ects. Nevertheless, there is a testable implication
of peer e®ects. In particular, in the above cases we observe that peer e®ects reduce the
variance of contributions between teams. We state this as our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 Peer e®ects reduce the variance of e®ort contributions. Hence, if peer
e®ects exists, the variance of e®orts is smaller in treatment MUTUAL than in OB-
SERVER/OBSERVED. In OBSERVER/OBSERVED the variance of e®orts is smaller
than in BASE.
3.2 Asymmetric peer e®ects and team spirit
Sacerdote (2001) reports peer e®ects in favor of low ability students. Similarly, Falk and
Ichino (2003) report experimental results according to which unproductive workers are
more in°uenced by others than productive ones. If this holds true also for our experiment,
peer e®ects can produce positive social multiplier e®ects, i.e., team spirit, especially in
treatment MUTUAL. The following cases 4 and 5 assume heterogeneity between teams
which are nevertheless homogenous within a team. This assumption enables us to illus-
trate the implications of heterogenous preferences without modelling this heterogeneity
on an individual basis.7
Case 4 (±i = 0:4; °i = 0; 8 i 2 X; ±j = 0:4; °j = 0:1;8 j 2 Y ; x0 = 20; y0 = 0):
This situation is the same as in case 1 with the only di®erence that subjects in the produc-
tive team X do not conform. This change has several e®ects which are shown in Figure
2. First, there is an e®ort-decreasing e®ect because cooperative subjects respond less to
others' cooperation in the own team. As a consequence, X-team contributions in BASE
decay faster than in case 1 (in the left panel of Figure 2 "av.X" is steeper than in Figure
1). However, there are also two e®ort-enhancing e®ects. The ¯rst one is that cooperative
subjects in team X are less in°uenced by the unproductive team Y . Hence, X-teams
7In fact, the simulations reveal very similar results for within- and between-team heterogeneity.
9exert higher e®orts in treatments OBSERVER and MUTUAL (see "av.X" in the central
and right panel of ¯gure 2). The second positive e®ect on e®orts arises because initially
unproductive subjects in Y -teams are nevertheless in°uenced by high contributions of the
other team in MUTUAL ("av.Y" in the right panel of ¯gure 2). Overall, these e®ects
result in the following predictions: xy (MUTUAL) > xy (OBSERVER/OBSERVED) =
xy (BASE).
Case 5 (±i = 0:4; °i = 0:1; 8 i 2 X; ±j = 0:4; °j = 0;8 j 2 Y ; x0 = 0; y0 = 20):
This is the same as case 3 with the only di®erence that now the productive subjects in
the Y -team do not conform. The e®ects of this change are analogous to those described
in case 4, with the di®erence that OBSERVED-team Y is not in°uenced to reduce e®orts.
The predictions in this case are: xy (MUTUAL) = xy (OBSERVER/OBSERVED) > xy
(BASE). We conclude from cases 4 and 5 that peer e®ects have the potential to stir team
spirit if those who contribute high e®orts are less susceptible to conformity than others:
Hypothesis 3 "Team spirit" may arise if peer e®ects are asymmetric in the sense that
these e®ects are stronger for subjects who provide low e®ort than for those who provide high
e®orts. If team spirit exists, e®ort in MUTUAL shall be higher than in other treatments.

























































Experiments were run between May and June 2002, at the Faculty of Social and Economic
Sciences at the University of Innsbruck. Nine experimental sessions were conducted with
a total of 212 undergraduate students from various majors as participants. 72 subjects
participated in MUTUAL, 64 in the mixed information treatments, i.e., 32 each in OB-
SERVED and OBSERVER; and 76 in BASE. The average subject earned Euro 8 (US $
108) within approximately 30 minutes. The experiments were programmed and conducted
using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999).
The following section 4.1 reports our results regarding the existence of peer e®ects.
In section 4.2 we test whether peer e®ects can give rise to e®ort enhancing e®ects in the
guise of team spirit.
4.1 The existence of peer e®ects
Table 2 shows the results of an OLS regression using data from treatments MUTUAL and
OBSERVER, i.e., from treatments where an X-team can observe a Y -team. Individuals'
own contributions in period t are regressed on explanatory variables in period t¡1. Using
lagged values for explanatory variables accounts for the classical simultaneity problem in
estimating social interaction e®ects. The numbers in parentheses show robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering on independent groups (i.e., pairs of teams). To test for
hypothesis 1 we estimate a subject's best response function as de¯ned in eq. (3). The
results of this estimation are shown in column (1) of table 2 (columns (2) and (3) will be
discussed later). A constant is included in the regression to account for the starting value
z0. Variable t is a linear time trend to capture the term ((® ¡ 1)=(±i + 2°i)) in eq. (3).
Consistent with many previous experiments the time trend is signi¯cantly negative
(e.g., Ledyard 1993). The positive and signi¯cant coe±cient on previous average e®orts
of the own team, x¡i(t¡1), is commonly referred to as conditional cooperation: a subject
is more likely to contribute to team production the more the others of the own team
have contributed in the previous period (see, the literature cited in the introduction). As
mentioned above, we attribute this result to a combined e®ect of reciprocity and peer
e®ects.
Our main interest is whether team Y has any in°uence on team X. Such relevance
is indeed con¯rmed by a positive and signi¯cant coe±cient on variable yj(t¡1). In eq. (3)
the coe±cient on yj(t¡1) is (°i=(±i +2°i). Hence, the regression provides evidence for peer
e®ects, i.e., °i > 0. This ¯nding is consistent with Falk and Ichino (2003) and recon¯rms
the results obtained Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005). We state this as our ¯rst result:
Result 1 In line with hypothesis 1, team e®orts positively correlate with e®orts of a
payo®-irrelevant second team. Peer e®ects exist.
Hypothesis 2 is a consequence of peer e®ects between teams. A variance ratio test
reveals that the standard deviation of e®orts is smaller in treatment MUTUAL than
in treatments OBSERVER/OBSERVED (7.25 vs. 7.79, p=0.004). As predicted the
variance is also smaller in MUTUAL than in BASE (7.25 vs. 7.72, p=0.008). These
11results con¯rms hypothesis 2. On the other hand, the standard deviation does not di®er
between treatments OBSERVER/OBSERVED and BASE (7.79 vs. 7.72, p=0.627).
Result 2 In line with hypothesis 2, the variance of team e®orts is smaller in MU-
TUAL than in both OBSERVER/OBSERVED and BASE. No e®ect exists between OB-
SERVER/OBSERVED and BASE.
Table 2: OLS regression with robust standard errors: MUTUAL and OBSERVER
Dependent variable: xit
Independent Coe±cient








F(3, 16) = 92:1¤¤¤
R2=0.323
Notes: *** = signi¯cance at 1%, * = signi¯cance at 10%
4.2 Team spirit: peer e®ects on the aggregate
The results of the previous section show that peer e®ects between teams exist. In this
section we evaluate the relevance of these e®ects on the aggregate e±ciency. Figure 3
shows the time pattern of average e®ort contributions. The left panel shows contributions
in treatments MUTUAL and BASE. Apparently, e®orts in MUTUAL are higher than
in BASE. Overall, the mean contribution are signi¯cantly di®erent between these two
treatments (12.9 vs 10.9, p=0.0618, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, one-sided) and it can be
seen that the di®erence grows larger from one period to the next.9
The right panel shows average contributions in OBSERVER/OBSERVED. For the ease
of comparison this ¯gure also includes contributions in MUTUAL. E®orts in MUTUAL
8The same p-value is obtained form a regression-based one-sided t-test which calculates robust stan-
dard errors adjusted for clustering on independent groups.
9In the last period, e®orts in MUTUAL are almost twice as high as in BASE (8.6 vs. 4.4 points,
p=0.021).


















































are signi¯cantly higher than in OBSERVED (p=0.062). The di®erence between MUTUAL
and OBSERVED is close to being signi¯cant (p=0.124). Although e®ort contributions are
slightly higher in OBSERVER than in OBSERVED, this di®erence is not signi¯cant (10.4
vs. 9.6, p=0.390). Finally, the di®erences between e®orts in BASE and OBSERVER are
not signi¯cant (10.9 vs. 10.4, p=0.479), nor are those between BASE and OBSERVED
(10.9 vs. 9.6, p=0.198).
With respect to the OBSERVER/OBSERVED conditions we regard two observations
as particularly noteworthy. First, being observed has no e®ect on e®orts as compared
to BASE. The literature sometimes hypothesizes such e®ects, e.g., under the notion of
esteem (Brennan and Pettit 2000). For instance, some people are more likely to refrain
from jaywalking or littering on the street when they are observed by others. Notice,
however, that self-esteem is di®erent from peer e®ects. Self-esteem is hypothesizes to
arise if one's actions are observed by others. Peer e®ects, in contrast, arise if one observes
the actions of others.
Second, although contributions in OBSERVER are slightly above those in OB-
SERVED, this di®erence is insigni¯cant. This observation tells us that mutual observabil-
ity is essential to trigger team spirit, i.e, multiplier e®ects caused by peer e®ects. Case 4
has illustrated that such a result may obtain if subjects who contribute high e®orts are
not in°uenced by others. It is noteworthy that e®orts in the OBSERVER-condition are
also not much higher than in BASE. We know from psychological experiments about the
relevance of social identi¯cation. A large body of research on in- and out-group phenom-
ena investigates whether and why people are more apt to cooperate with members of a
socially identi¯ed in-group (e.g., De Cremer and van Dijk 2002). However, careful exper-
imental research by Yamagishi and Kiyonari (2000) has revealed that in-group favoritism
quickly fades away when subjects learn about the true cooperativeness of the other play-
13ers. That there is no treatment e®ect between OBSERVER and OBSERVED, indicates
that team-identi¯cation is of little relevance in our design. In fact, we use neutral word-
ing and assure complete anonymity of interactions. These precautions leave indeed little
room for social identi¯cation of subjects within teams.
Overall, our observations are consistent with the results from the simulations in cases
2 and 4 (see, section 3). In case 2 peer e®ects slow down the decay in cooperation in
MUTUAL and OBSERVER such that contributions in these treatments exceed those in
treatments OBSERVED and BASE. In case 4 high contributors are less in°uenced by
others through peer e®ects than low contributors. As a consequence, e®ort contributions
in MUTUAL exceeded those of all other treatments. We now turn to the question whether
such asymmetric peer e®ects exist in our experimental data.
4.3 Are peer e®ects asymmetric?
A natural way to answer this question is to evaluate the treatment e®ect between MU-
TUAL and BASE for di®erent percentiles of the contribution distribution. If the presence
of another team in treatment MUTUAL a®ects equally productive and unproductive sub-
jects, the treatment e®ect shall not di®er between lower and higher percentiles.
Table 3: Estimates of asymmetric treatment e®ects between MUTUAL and BASE: quan-
tile regressions
Quantile
0.15 0:3 0:5 0:7 0.85
(1) BASE -5*** -5*** -4*** -2* 0
(N=2240) (1.240) (0.503) (0.968) (1.051) (0.134)
(2) BASE -5*** -5*** -6*** -2* 0
(N=1936) (0.788) (0.894) (1.342) (0.918) (0.150)
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; *** = signi¯cance at 1%, * = signi¯cance at 10%.
Row (1) of Table 3 reports the estimated treatment e®ect for the 15th, 30th, 50th,
70th, and 85th percentile of the contribution distribution. Row (2) is explained in the next
section. The results show that subjects who contribute at the lower part of the distribution
are more a®ected by the treatment variation, compared to high-contributors. For subjects
in the highest percentile there is no treatment e®ect at all. Tests for signi¯cance illustrate
the magnitude of these e®ects: the di®erence in the treatment e®ect is not signi¯cant
between the 30th and 50th percentile (p=0.264); it is signi¯cant between the 50th and
70th percentile (p=0.001). We summarize these ¯ndings as a separate result:
14Result 3 Peer e®ects are asymmetric: subjects who contribute less to team production
are more a®ected by the variation of treatments between MUTUAL and BASE, compared
to high contributors. In line with hypothesis 3, asymmetric peer e®ects can consistently
explain team spirit as reason why e®ort contributions in MUTUAL exceed those in OB-
SERVER/OBSERVED and BASE.
4.4 Peer e®ects and imitation
So far we have seen that peer e®ects exist between payo®-independent teams. Further-
more, we have found that the experimental data can be consistently explained by team
spirit emerging from asymmetric peer e®ects. In this section we discuss whether learning
can provide an alternative account to explain our experimental results.
Typically, in the context of a repeated public good game by learning we mean that
subjects learn to choose the individually rational payo®-dominant strategy. Since the
dominant strategy is to contribute zero, this interpretation of learning cannot explain
our results. However, people employ several modes of learning in dynamic games and
some of these generate predictions quite similar to our results (for a survey, see, Camerer
2003, Ch. 6). To illustrate, take imitation of successful behavior as a particularly in-
tuitive learning mode.10 In our design, subjects can observe the average behavior and
the outcome achieved by another team. This information enables subjects in team X
to learn about the relation between aggregate e®ort contributions and average payo® in
team Y . Furthermore, imitation would exhibit asymmetric e®ects since members of an
unproductive team have a higher potential to learn than those of a productive team.
Our design is not powerful enough to strictly di®erentiate between peer e®ects and
imitation. However, we can ask whether the previous results also hold when X-team
subjects have a reduced incentive to imitate the observed Y -team. Following this intuition,
row (2) of Table 3 (see, previous subsection) re-estimates the same quantile regressions
as in row (1) with the only di®erence that the sample in treatment MUTUAL is reduced
to those observations where the own team performed better than the observed team in
the previous period. Apparently, if the own team has achieved better outcomes than the
observed team, an imitator has little incentive to be in°uenced by that team. Row (2),
nevertheless, shows similar asymmetric treatment e®ects between low and high percentiles
of the contribution distribution as before: with the only exception of the 50th percentile,
subjects who contribute at the lower part of the distribution are more a®ected by the
treatment variation than high-contributors. We therefore regard it is very unlikely that
our previous results were just due to imitation.
10The empirical relevance of imitation has been established for instance by Huck, Normann, and Ä Ochsler
(1999).
155 Conclusion
In a recent study Falk and Ichino (2003) have established the empirical relevance of
peer e®ects between individuals. In this paper we test whether such peer e®ects are
generalizable to explain why free riding in teams is not excessive. In particular, we test
whether the opportunity of teams to compare each others' performance stirs a spirit of
teams towards greater e®ort. By team spirit we mean social multiplier e®ects caused by
peer e®ects and the fact that members of an unproductive team choose as standard for
the own e®ort that of another, productive team.
We have argued that testing for team spirit is di±cult in the ¯eld because it is hardly
possible to ¯nd a setting in which the e®ects of both, endogenous and exogenous char-
acteristics of a team can be controlled for simultaneously. To avoid this problem of
identi¯cation we propose an experimental design in which team members contribute to
independent team projects. Apart from varying the information regarding the relative
team performance, the incentive structure is held constant across all treatments. By this
means we disentangle the motivating e®ects of team spirit against alternative accounts.
The main result is that teams are more productive when teams can observe each others
performance. In contrast, we do not ¯nd enhanced contributions under conditions of
unilaterally observing or being observed by another team.
To explain these ¯ndings we provide a detailed account of team spirit as an implication
of peer e®ects. Thereby, an essential ingredient of team spirit is that peer e®ects are
asymmetric: team spirit evolves if peer e®ects are stronger for unproductive than for
productive teams. Our results 1 and 2 establish the existence of peer e®ects between
teams. Result 3 shows that these e®ects are asymmetric: the e®ort enhancing peer e®ects
outweigh the e®ort withholding ones.
An important question is whether e®ort enhancing e®ects between teams arise from
team spirit or whether such e®ects are an out°ow of imitating behavior between teams.
We address this question empirically by con¯ning the data set to cases where imitation
would not make sense from a learning perspective. This analysis reveals that our results
regarding the existence and asymmetry of peer e®ects remain valid also when imitation
less of a concern.
Our study suggest that already a little information may go a long way, i.e. the pub-
lic announcement of relative performance measures can trigger a spirit of teams towards
greater e®orts. In our design a subjects' welfare is independent of relative team per-
formance and there are no stakes for rivalry between teams. The paper, therefore, dif-
fers fundamentally from a growing number of studies about the motivating e®ects of
tournament-based, competitive pay-schemes (Nalbantian and Schotter 1997), or the ef-
fects of between-group competition on within-group cooperation (for a survey see Born-
stein 2003). These studies impose incentives on individuals to compete between teams,
16removing the opportunity to isolate implicit motivating e®ects of team spirit. We also
do not add anything to ease monitoring or sanctioning that could explain more coopera-
tion in teams, for instance, due to a social norm of reciprocity (Carpenter and Matthews
2001). Our ¯nding may explain, for instance, why team incentives can raise productiv-
ity against standard theoretical predictions (e.g., Ichniowsky, Shaw, and Prennushi 1997,
Boning, Ichniowsky, and Shaw 2001). Finally, previous experimental studies by Schot-
ter and Weigelt (1992) and Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1993) have found that relative
compensation results in higher e®orts even if this is not supported by the solution of a
non-cooperative game. We think that the prevalence of team spirit provides an intuitive
explanation for such empirical observations.
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19Appendix AI: De¯nition of variables in treatment MUTUAL
There are i = 1;:::;m subjects in team X and j = m+1;:::;(m+n) subjects in team Y .
Consider m = 4 and n = 4 and call xit subject i0s contribution in the X-team and yjt sub-
ject j0s contribution in the Y -team in period t. Eq. (5) is: zt = max[0;Atz0+
Pt¡1
h=0 Ahc].
Here, zt denotes the vector of contributions with z0
t = fx1t;x2t;x3t;x4t;y5t;y6t;y7t;y8tg. c









Finally, A is a matrix that weighs contributions from the previous period as function of





























































































































































































































































20Appendix AII: Experimental Instructions (Original Instructions were in German.
These are the instructions for treatment MUTUAL. Those for all other treatments are
available on request.)
Thank you for participating in the experiment. If you read these instructions carefully and
follow all rules, you can earn money. The money will be paid out to you in cash immediately
after the experiment. During the experiment we shall not speak of Euro but rather of points.
Points are converted to Euro at the following exchange rate: 100 Points = 1.50 Euro It is
forbidden to speak to other participants during the experiment. If you have any question, please
ask us. We will gladly answer your questions individually. It is very important that you follow
this rule. Otherwise, we shall have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
Participants of this experiments are randomly assigned into groups of 4 members, i.e., there are
three more persons forming a group together with you. The composition of groups will remain
the same during the whole experiment, i.e. there will always be the same persons in your group.
The identity of your group members will not be revealed to you at any time. At the start of each
period, each participant gets 20 points. We will refer to these points as your endowment. Your
task is it to decide, how many of your 20 points you want to contribute to a project or to keep for
yourself. Your income consists of two parts: (1) Points that you keep (2) Your "income from the
project". This income is calculated as follows: Your income from the project 0.4 times the sum
of contributions of all group members to the project The income of the other members of your
group is determined in the same way, i.e. each group member receives the same income from
the project. Suppose, for example, that the total contributions to the project by all members
in your group sum up to 60. In this case you and every other member of your group receives
0:4£60 = 24 points as income from the project. Suppose that you and the other 3 members of
your group in total contribute only 10 points to the project. In this case every group member
receives 0:4£10 = 4 points as income from the project. For each point that you keep for yourself
you earn an income of one point. If you contribute that point to the project, instead, the sum
of contributions to the project would rise by one point, and your income from the project would
rise by 0:4 £ 1 = 0:4 points. However, the income of the other group members would also rise
by 0.4 points, such that the total income of the group would rise by 4 £ 0:4 = 1:6 points. Your
contribution to the project, therefore, raises the income of the other members of your group. On
the other hand, you earn from each point that other members of your group contribute to the
project. For each point that another group member contributes, you earn 0:4 £ 1 = 0:4 points.
You take your choice via the computer. At the beginning of every period you see a decision
screen.
Original instructions contained a decision screen here.
In the area at the bottom you enter how many of your 20 points you want to contribute
to the project. The main area of the screen above consists of two parts: On the left you ¯nd
the information concerning your group. First you see your contribution of the previous period.
Below you ¯nd the sum of contributions to the project of all members in your group. The next
line below shows your income of the previous period. Your income is determined as the sum of
points that you have kept for yourself and the income from the project. A bit further down you
21see the "average group income of all previous periods". This number shows the average income
of your group added over all previous periods together. Remark: In the ¯rst period (as here in
the ¯gure of the screen) there are no previous periods yet. For this reasons all numbers in the
¯gure show zero yet.
On the right side of the screen you ¯nd information regarding another group. Just as your
group, this other group consists of four participants. The four participants forming the other
group will be the same during the whole experiment. The income of these four participants is
determined in the same way as yours, i.e. all members of the other group decide how many of
their 20 points they want to contribute to a project. The project of the other group is completely
independent of your project. The ¯rst line shows the sum of contributions to the project of all
members in the other group. The second line a bit below shows the average income of the
other group added over all previous periods. Please note: Members of your and the other group
mutually observe each other, i.e. the other group sees the same information regarding your group
as you see regarding the other group. After all participants have made their contributions a new
period starts, in which you decide again how many of your 20 points you want to contribute to
the project. In total there will be 20 periods.
22